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I INTRODUCTION
In terms of South African common law, directors of companies have two
duties. First is fiduciary duties, which do not require fault for liability (a
form of strict liability). Second is the duty of care and skill, which has
always been accepted as delictual in nature.
The rationale behind the duty of care and skill is to prevent those in
charge of the management of the company from allowing it to act in a
manner that could harm such a company. The law therefore utilises the
law of delict to hold these company stewards to account, and to make
good the harm suffered by the wronged party, being the company which
such wrongdoers are managing. The Companies Act1 (‘the Act’) has to
an extent codified the common law duty of care and skill of directors,
and has confirmed that the liability for the breach of this duty is delictual
in nature.
South African company law further provides that a company’s
business may not be conducted with gross negligence, ‘recklessly’ or
fraudulently. In s 424 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (‘the 1973 Act’),
any person could hold another person liable who essentially allowed the
company to conduct business in a reckless manner.2 At face value, it
appeared (and case law seems to have confirmed this) that the statutory
remedy was intended primarily for creditors, and mostly utilised by such
creditors when a company was in liquidation. Section 424 of the 1973
Act has been replaced by s 22(1), as read with section 77(3)(b) of the Act.
The Act, however, also provides that Chapter XIV of the 1973 Act
continues to apply in respect of the liquidation of insolvent companies.3
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1 Companies Act 71 of 2008.
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Section 424 of the Act is therefore in theory still available to creditors as
long as a company is formally in liquidation.
The purpose of this article is to critically evaluate both forms of
liability, and to determine their relationship, interaction and continued
relevance. On the one hand, the article will attempt to show that the
remedy in respect of breach of the duty of care and skill traditionally
existed for the benefit of the company, a position which the Act confirms
in section 77(2)(b), but attenuates through the operation of business
judgment rule. On the other hand, it will attempt to show that whilst the
reckless trading provisions (with the consequent liability) was tradition-
ally utilised by creditors, the current Act has seemingly deprived
creditors of this remedy to some extent,4 and that the company itself
now has both remedies available to it.
Thus the issue becomes whether a company is in need of both,
especially as liability based on reckless trading seems a less onerous
remedy from a litigant-company’s perspective. Why would a company
pursue a remedial avenue (breach of the duty of care and skill) if such a
course of action is more burdensome than an alternative remedy of
similar effect?
Within this critical assessment of the two remedies, the article will
further argue that the remedial dispensation of creditors has also
undergone a significant change, and that the current remedy for reckless
trading has supplanted the creditors with the company as the primary
claimant. It will further show why this, counter-intuitively, is an
appropriate change. The focus will be on insolvent companies, before
and after formal liquidation.
II THE DUTY OF CARE AND SKILL
(a) Common law
The duty of care and skill is delictual in nature and any liability of a
director for damages which he causes the company is based on delictual
principles,5 yet the inquiry around care and skill centres primarily on
negligence.6 It is a received product of English tort law, as modified to
function within the South African abstract and largely Roman-Dutch
4 Section 218 of the Act will be considered below.
5 Bouwman, ‘An appraisal of the modification of the director’s duty of care and skill’ (2009)
21 SA Merc LJ 509 at 510, and Kennedy-Good & Coetzee, ‘The business judgment rule (Part
2)’ (2006) Obiter 277 at 281.
6 Cassim (ed) et al, Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (Juta 2012) 554.
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chassis of delict.7 The exact legal position relating to the common law
standard has remained unclear,8 and it must be noted from the outset
that the remedy’s successful use is an exceptionally rare occurrence.9
In the English decision of In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and
Estates Limited10 (‘Brazilian Rubber’), widely regarded as the founding
case for the modern duty of care and skill, the court (Chancery Division)
held that a director should act with the degree of care as could be
reasonably expected of him, taking into consideration his knowledge
and experience.11 The court further held that such a director is not
expected ‘to bring any special qualifications to his office’.12 Reasonable
care for the court meant the care which an ordinary person would be
expected to take in the same circumstances, and mere errors of
judgment could not be a basis for liability.13
Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd (‘Equitable Fire’) adds to this
by making two points. The first is that ‘[i]n ascertaining the duties of a
director of a company, it is necessary to consider the nature of the
company’s business and the manner in which the work of the company
is, reasonably in the circumstances and consistently with the articles of
association, distributed ...’. Second is that the duty requires only that a
director display: honesty; the type of care to be expected from an
‘ordinary man’, but not ‘a greater degree of skill than may reasonably be
expected from a person of his knowledge and experience’; and need not
give the business’ affairs constant attention (as his duties are of an
‘intermittent nature’).14
What is clear from the early English pronouncements is that, if a
director acted honestly,15 an error of judgment was not regarded as
actionable unless there was gross negligence.16 Over time, the duty thus
formulated, alongside many other fundamental principles of English
company law, found reception in South African jurisprudence.
7 The dynamics of its interaction with King II and King III are beyond the scope of this
article.
8 Bekink, ‘An historical overview of the director’s duty of care and skill: From the
nineteenth century to the Companies Bill of 2007’ (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 95 at 95.
9 Jones, ‘Directors’ duties: negligence and the business judgment rule’ (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ
326 at 326–327 and 332. See also Bouwman, (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 509 at 526, stating that there
is only one reported successful case — Niagara Ltd (in liquidation) v Langerman & others 1913
WLD 188.
10 In Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations And Estates Limited [1911] Ch 425.
11 In Re Brazilian Rubber para 430.
12 In Re Brazilian Rubber para 430.
13 In Re Brazilian Rubber para 430.
14 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407.
15 Bekink, (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 95 at 98.
16 Bekink, (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 95 at 97.
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However, these cases remained highly influential. The leading South
African case on the duty of care and skill of directors is Fisheries
Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen,17 where the court makes
a number of seminal observations.
First and foremost is the delictual element of negligence, which under
this remedy is somewhat modified. First, the nature of the company’s
business as well as the duties of a director are determinative of the extent
of the duty of care and skill required of a director.18 Second, directors’
duties and qualifications are not analogous to those of an auditor or an
accountant,19 and neither special business expertise, nor intimate
knowledge of the business is required.20 What is expected of a director is
simply that he exercises ‘the care which can reasonably be expected of a
person with his knowledge and experience’.21 Whilst such a director may
receive, accept and rely on the advice of others, ultimately he must
exercise his own judgment.22
From the above, as well as academic commentary, it is generally
accepted that, despite the primacy of delictual negligence in the inquiry,
the common law duty of care and skill is at heart more subjective than
objective — the individual director is considered, and is neither
measured against the reasonable person nor against the reasonable
director, but what the reasonable thing would have been for such a
director to have done.23
Thus, on the other hand, there is also an objective dimension to the
standard, ie that ‘reasonable’ care can be established objectively. Broadly
speaking, it could be stated that the ‘reasonable’ element is objective, yet
the ‘man’ element is subjective.24 Whether fundamentally subjective or
17 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen; Fisheries Development Corpora-
tion of SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 156 (W).
18 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd para 165 — such that non-executive
directors, unlike executive directors, are not required to pay continuous attention to the
business of the company because their duties are intermittent in nature, performed at board
meetings as and when they are held. Non-executive directors are, however, not bound to
attend these board meetings.
19 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd para 165.
20 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd para 165.
21 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd para 165 [own emphasis].
22 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd para 165, and generally for the above Bekink,
(2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 95 at 100–101, Bouwman, (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 509 at 510–511 and
514–515.
23 Cassim (ed) et al, (Juta 2012) 558; Cassidy, ‘Models for reform: The directors’ duty of
care in a modern commercial world’ (2009) 20(3) Stell LR 373 at 376 & 383–385; see also the
commentary of Bekink, (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 95 at 99–103 as well as Bouwman, (2009) SA
Merc LJ 509 at 510–512.
24 It has also been stated that ‘care’ is the objective and ‘skill’ the subjective elements
respectively — Bouwman, (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 509 at 510.
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objective,25 it is clear that one is dealing at least with a practically
differentiated ‘reasonable director’, rooted in the facts of each case as it is
considered. It has also been argued, correctly, that the ‘subjective’
element is as much a function of its mixed legal heritage as it is a function
of the variable nature of directorship itself.26
(b) Statutory law: potential divergence and the effect of the
business judgment rule
The Act codifies the duty of care and skill without abolishing the
common law.27 Yet the codification may have brought about a diver-
gence between the common law and statutory tests for care and skill
respectively. There are, in essence, two competing views, of which a brief
analysis is made below.
The position in favour of a broadly non-disparate common law and
statutory duty is succinctly stated by Du Plessis.28 Here it is argued that
the statutory test for the reasonable director remains subjective, as the
objective dimension of the ‘reasonable director’ is attenuated by a
pre-emptive and subjective ‘setting’ of the standard with reference to the
knowledge and skill of the particular director in question, potentially
upwards but generally downwards. This approach follows Fisheries
Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen as discussed above.29
Yet as noted, South African courts have largely been influenced by
English precedents in the interpretation of the duties of directors.30
Starting from Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing,31 the English courts
have begun to interpret their counter-equivalent statutory formulation
of the duty in an increasingly objective manner, allowing an upward
adjustment for more knowledgeable directors, but no downwards
adjustment below the standard set by the ‘ordinary’ reasonable person.32
Lord Justice Hoffman in particular has lead the charge, basing his
25 It is not within the scope of this article to consider this debate in any detail.
26 This is as the subject of the duty is not, as ordinarily in delict, a legal person, but rather the
legal capacity in which a person is acting — see, for example, Bekink, (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 95
at 102; and also Cassidy, (2009) 20 Stell LR 373 at 385.
27 Section 76(3)(c).
28 Du Plessis, ‘Directors’ duty of care skill and diligence’ in Mongalo (ed) Modern Company
Law for a Competitive South African Economy (Juta 2010) 263.
29 See s 2(a) supra, and n17.
30 Bekink, (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 95 at 102.
31 [1989] BCLC 498.
32 See Bekink, (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 95 at 99.
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approach on the formulation found in s 214(4) of the Insolvency Act of
1986, and effected a broad change on the approach of English common
law.33
What makes this second, more objective and stricter approach
significant is the wording of the current Act. The partial codification of
the duty of care and skill, introduced in s 76(3)(c) of the South African
Companies Act, appears to be lifted largely34 from the wording of the
new United Kingdom Companies Act, which adopted, by and large, the
same wording as the Insolvency Act mentioned above. Therefore, it is
quite possible that a more objective, upwardly adjustable formulation of
the duty, as in the English judgments cited,35 is the true manner in which
to approach this provision.36
The common law position remains aligned to the Jorgensen case, but it
is thus arguable that the scope of the statutory duty is narrower, and only
adjustable upwards beyond the ordinary standard of the diligens
paterfamilias.37 The strictest interpretation would be that the test,
supported by the appearance of some objective measures within the
wording of the statutory provision, has been brought closer to the
original principles of delict, and that the standard of care is objective and
adjustable only upwards. The subjective differentiation becomes a
secondary question based on the factual matrix at hand.38
For a detailed discussion of this topic in particular, however, see the
contributions of Du Plessis,39 and Cilliers et al,40 and Cassidy,41
Bekink,42 and Bouwman,43 alongside the English cases and other
authority cited. The strictest interpretation possible places the highest
burden on the analysis below, and thus is the most careful and
33 See Bekink, (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 95 at 99; Bouwman, (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 509 at 512.
See also the judgments found in Norman v Theodore Goddard [1991] BCLC 1028 (CLD); Re
D’Jan of London Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 561 (Ch); Cohen v Selby [2001] 1 BCLC 176, CA paras 10
and 21; Re Westlowe Storage and Distribution Ltd [2000] 2 BCLC 590, 611, to name a few.
34 With the exception of the addition of ‘diligence’ — a seemingly Australian contribution,
as per Du Plessis, ‘A comparative analysis of directors’ duty of care, skill and diligence in South
Africa and in Australia’ (2010) Acta Juridica 263 at 268.
35 Cf n33.
36 This has also been argued to be the better approach — Cassidy, (2009) Stell LR 373 at 375
& 377.
37 Cassidy, (2009) 20 Stell LR 373 at 377 & 385–386.
38 Bekink, (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 95 at 111, Bouwman, (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 509 at 513–514,
and n37 above.
39 Du Plessis, (2010) Acta Juridica 263 at 263.
40 Cilliers et al, Cilliers and Benade: Corporate Law 3 ed (Butterworth 2000) 147 paras
10.30–10.32.
41 Cassidy, (2009) 20 Stell LR 373 at 376 & 383–385.
42 Bekink, (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 95 at 8.
43 Bouwman, (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 509.
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appropriate approach, and will be used when discussing the impact of
the business judgment rule.
(i) The impact of the business judgment rule
The test for breach of the statutory duty of care and skill (as well as some
of the statutory directors’ fiduciary duties) in the current Act’s regime is
attenuated by another new element. This is the so-called ‘business
judgment rule’, found in s 76(4)(a) of the Act. It has a profound impact
on the standard of conduct inherent in the statutory duty of care and
skill.
The Act, shortly, stipulates in s 76 that:
‘(4) In respect of any particular matter arising in the exercise of the powers
or the performance of the functions of director, a particular director of a
company-
(a) will have satisfied the obligations of subsection (3)(b) and (c) if ...’.
the director has ‘made a decision, or supported the decision of a
committee or the board, with regard to that matter, and the director had
a rational basis for believing, and did believe, that the decision was in the
best interests of the company’.44
There are other components to this rule (for instance relating to the
use of information or reliance on the performance of others), but the
focus here is on the effect of the above excerpt of the section. At the core
of this rule is the establishment of a rebuttable presumption that a
director has acted (1) in good faith, (2) on an informed basis, and (3)
with the honest belief that the best interests of the company will be
served.45 That is the essence of the standard of review found in the
business judgment rule.46
Whilst it is still far from settled who bears the onus of proof regarding
s 76(4),47 a company would only be successful if it cannot be proven
that: (1) a director took ‘reasonably diligent steps to become informed
about the matter’,48 and (2) had no ‘material personal financial interest
in the subject matter of the transaction’,49 and (3) factually ‘took a
44 Section 76(4)(a)(iii) [own emphasis].
45 Bouwman, (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 509 at 523, Jones, (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 326 at 329,
Cassidy, (2009) Stell LR 373 at 398, and Kennedy-Good & Coetzee, ‘The business judgment
rule (Part 1)’ (2006) Obiter 62 at 65 & 70.
46 See Kennedy-Good & Coetzee, (2006) Obiter 62 at 63 & n12.
47 Cassim (ed) et al, (Juta 2012) 565.
48 Section 76(4)(a)(i).
49 Section 76(4)(a)(ii).
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decision’, and (4) ‘had a rational basis for believing that the decision was
in the best interests of the company’, and (5) ‘did [indeed] believe ... the
decision was in the best interests of the company’.50 In s 76(4)(b) read
with s 76(5), the director is ‘entitled to rely on’ (ie read: not liable if he
did rely on ...) the performance of certain persons and certain informa-
tion.
Therefore — in the absence of personal interests and the exculpatory
effect of s 76(5) — the two salient requirements arising from the
business judgment rule would seem to be the taking of reasonable steps
to ensure a decision is informed, as well as the two-step requirement of
believing a decision to be in the best interests of the company and having
a rational basis for that belief.
As a starting point, a director might act to ensure that he has no
undisclosed personal interests and take reasonably diligent steps to
inform himself of material considerations and facts when taking a
decision, but these are merely steps he may follow to ensure he complies
with s 76(3)(c) via s 76(4). It is quite clear, however, that the underlying
consideration of compliance with the duty of care and skill, as far as the
business judgment rule is concerned, remains the rational-basis require-
ment found in s 76(4)(a)(iii).51
It is crucial not to conflate the concepts of reasonableness and
rationality. In the context of fiduciary duties (specifically the proper
exercise of powers by directors) Rogers J, in Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v
Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and others,52 gives a measure of content to
the ‘rationality requirement’ of this rule. The dictum begins by stating:53
‘Section 76(4) makes clear that the duty imposed by s 76(3)(b) to act in the
best interests of the company is not an objective one, in the sense of
entitling a court, if a board decision is challenged, to determine what is
objectively speaking in the best interests of the company. What is required
is that the directors, having taken reasonably diligent steps to become
informed, should subjectively have believed that their decision was in the
best interests of the company and this belief must have had ‘‘a rational
basis’’. The subjective test accords with the conventional approach to
directors’ duties ...’.
50 Section 76(4)(a)(iii).
51 Cassidy, (2009) 20 Stell LR 373 at 375; in contrast to cl 91(2) of the Companies Bill of
2007, which required ‘reasonableness’ — Bouwman, (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 509 at 528; Jones,
(2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 326 at 329–330.
52 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC).
53 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd para 74.
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The court then further states that:54
‘Section 76 requires the bona fide assessment of the directors to have a
rational underpinning. This requirement has been articulated less fre-
quently in the conventional statement of directors’ duties, but is not
necessarily an innovation.’
However, the analysis of a decision’s rational basis is objective in nature,
whilst the quality of the decision introduces certain subjective elements
relating to the director in question.55 It is here that the court engages in a
creative exercise of judicial cross-pollination, and turns to the readily
comparable principles of administrative law for clarity. Specifically, it
looks to jurisprudence regarding the ‘rationality’ criterion available as a
ground for review of administrative action as per s 6(2)(f)(ii) of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, (herewith referred to as
‘PAJA’)56 and more generally (and to the point) the legality principle in
this field in general.57
Subsections (aa)–(dd) of s 6(2)(f)(ii) of PAJA point to, respectively,
the purpose of the administrative action, the purpose of its authorising
provision, the information available to the administrator, and the
reasons provided, as benchmarks to which the action must bear a
‘rational connection’. This section from PAJA further underscores the
more general meaning attributed by the court to rationality, as hinging
on the relationship between the power being exercised, and the purpose
for which it was conferred. To quote, the question then becomes ‘...
[w]as the decision or the means employed rationally related to the
purpose for which the power was given?’58
What this means for s 76(4)(a)(iii) of the Act is that, as it does in the
context of legality,59 is that the courts’ role is not to supplant the
judgment of an actor in matters of how he should have exercised the
corporate powers conferred. Moreover, the inquiry is limited, and any
consideration of the ‘merits and the wisdom of business decisions’ is
54 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd para 75.
55 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd para 76 — cf. below at s 2(b)(ii), and n49 above. See also Jones,
(2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 326 at 332; Cassidy, (2009) 20 Stell LR 373 at 398–399.
56 of 2000 (‘PAJA’).
57 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd para 74.
58 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd para 75, and the authorities quoted therein: Association of Regional
Magistrates of Southern Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa & others 2013 (7)
BCLR 762 (CC) paras 49–50, and Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau & others
[2014] ZACC 18 para 69.
59 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd para 74 — see Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA &
another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa & others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) as
per Chaskalson P (as he then was) para 90; see also Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others
1999 (3) SA 304 (LAC) para 36.
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quite strictly beyond the ambit of the courts’ purview.60 It is rather to
determine whether the decision factually made, was rationally related to
the purpose for which that power to make such a decision was conferred.
In other words, the court applies this construction of the rationality of
the exercise of a public power (‘with modifications’) to the exercise of a
corporate power by a corporate actor.61
The final question is then whether this construction — appearing in
the context of fiduciary duties — can be applied to the duty of care and
skill in s 76(3)(c). It has been widely stated that the business judgment
rule relates to the duty of care and skill on the basis of ‘decision-
making’.62 The statutory approach to this duty remains a question of
whether a director subjectively exercised his powers and performed his
functions in a manner (ie a qualitative approach in keeping with the duty
of care and skill’s focus on ‘how’, compared to the ‘what’ of fiduciary
duties) that is consistent with the way in which an objectively reasonable
director with the company’s best interests at heart would have done.
Yet in the current companies regime, there is a pre-emptive ‘gate-
keeper’ in the form of the criterion of rationality — an imperative of
s 76(4)(a)(iii) of the Act. In cases where s 76(3)(c) is involved, the
rational relationship must exist between (1) the belief and concomitant
decision (the ‘assessment’ as per Rogers J, above), and (2) the reasoning
behind it (the ‘underpinning’ as per Rogers J, above). This innovative
approach, borrowing from pre-existing legal doctrine on rationality,
may not necessarily stand the test of time, but provides a useful starting
point as far as case law authority on s 76(4) is concerned.
Thus the law currently seems to require that, objectively speaking and
without regards to the merits of the decision,63 there is no rational
connection whatsoever between (1) a belief on the part of a director that
a specific exercise of his powers would be in the best interests of the
company, which belief results in a concrete decision or judgment, and
(2) the reason for the director holding such a belief, and acting
60 Cassim (ed) et al, (Juta 2012) 565, Bouwman, (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 509 at 525 & 531, and
Kennedy-Good & Coetzee, (2006) Obiter 62 at 70–71. See also Levin v Felt & Tweeds Ltd 1951
(2) SA 401 (A) para 414 to the effect that:
‘[i]n the absence of any allegation that the directors acted mala fide this amounts to
asking this Court to usurp the functions of the directors and to consider what is the
best for the company from the business point of view. This is not the function of a
Court of law.’
61 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd para 78.
62 Jones, (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 326 at 329, and Kennedy-Good & Coetzee, (2006) Obiter 62
at 64.
63 And in all likelihood also to some degree dependent on the circumstances — Jones,
(2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 326 at 330.
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thereupon. It is submitted that this is a far more forgiving threshold than
the standard of reasonableness found in the care and skill inquiry.
Whether procedurally it functions as a defence to the care and skill
inquiry, functions to negate the cause of action for such a claim, or is
part and parcel of the inquiry itself,64 the business judgment rule has an
important effect on s 76(3)(c). If s 76(4) is to function in certain cases as
a shield against liability for the breach of the duty of care and skill, it
logically cannot set a higher or equivalent standard of conduct than the
one prescribed by the duty of care and skill itself.
Following this reasoning, on the spectrum of conduct which exists
between excessive reasonableness and the most severe gross negligence,
there must be a portion that lies between (1) the most severe gross
negligence, and (2) the most tenuously acceptable reasonableness,
which is not covered by s 76(4) — otherwise s 76(3)(c) will be rendered
redundant. Put simply: if a director acted unreasonably, he may yet
escape liability because he acted at least rationally. The question is
therefore: how unreasonably may a director act before he cannot be
protected by the defence of a rational basis for his decision? The degree
to which the business judgment rule’s import of rationality encroaches
on what would (but for its effect) have been considered a breach of the
duty of care and skill is the focus of the next section.
(ii) The bottom line: gross negligence?
What is clear from Section II is that the common law test for negligence
in (what could be termed ‘ordinary’) delictual actions has been adapted
for the inquiry relating to the care and skill of directors. At common law,
there is a subjective attenuation of that standard, lowering it to that of
the reasonable director with the same knowledge and experience as the
director is question. Nonetheless, assuming — to the detriment of any
directors’ legal position — that the statutory standard has become
adjustable upwards only, what is the effect of rationality, and the
business judgment rule in general on that standard?
In short, the portion of the spectrum that would ‘activate’ liability in
care and skill cases is made smaller than the activating portion of the
spectrum in ordinary delict. Directors can therefore — in a manner of
speaking — act more unreasonably than other hypothetical actors in the
sphere of delict.65 The business judgment rule compounds this, further
64 Elements of the section which are, again, not within the scope of this article, and better
left to an in-depth analysis of their own.
65 See also Jones, (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 326 at 327.
(2016) 28 SA MERC LJ260
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
narrowing the potential for liability and allowing even more unreason-
able conduct to escape liability.
This is clear from Visser Sitrus, which states that:66
‘[The] rationality criterion as laid down in s 76 is an objective one,
but its threshold is quite different from, and more easily met than, a
determination as to whether the decision was objectively in the best
interests of the company.’
By setting an exculpatory standard of rationality, which ostensibly
excludes any judicial consideration of the merits of directors’ deci-
sions,67 s 76(4) also substantially narrows the potential scope of liability
in terms of s 76(3)(c). Its effect is that an objectively unreasonable
decision also cannot result in liability if it was (1) reasonably informed,
and (2) rational in relation to its basis.
Comparatively, the jurisprudence of the United States (from which
the business judgment rule originates, and where all directors’ duties are
combined, and subject to its effect)68 indicates that the rule serves to
cover all but the most serious cases of directors’ ill-judgment,69 and has
limited the application of care and skill.70 In the United States, rational-
ity allows far more discretion than reasonableness. Conversely, the
Australian version of the statutory business judgment rule provides that
such a ‘belief or judgment’ about the best interests of the company ‘is a
rational one unless the belief is one that no reasonable person in [the
directors’] position would hold.’71 This seems to indicate, and it has
been stated as such, that reasonableness is the benchmark for rationality
in the Australian context.72
Yet neither of these positions could hold ‘out and out’ in South Africa.
If reasonableness were the test for rationality, the scope of conduct
permitted by s 76(4) would be lesser or identical to the scope of conduct
permitted by the standard of care and skill, and logically the former
would have little or no effect save to redundantly reinforce the ordinary
standard for care and skill. On the other hand, it is generally accepted
66 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd para 76 [own emphasis].
67 See n60 supra.
68 Bouwman, (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 509 at 531.
69 Hansen, ‘The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the duty of due care and the
business judgment rule’ (1986) 41 Bus Law 1257 — as in Cassim (ed) et al, (Juta 2012) 565 and
n264.
70 Jones, (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 326 at 327.
71 Austin & Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law 14 ed (LexisNexis 2010) 437
[own emphasis].
72 Idem at 440.
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that the American version of the rule is constituted too widely for South
African jurisprudential tastes.73
It is not the aim of this section to state categorically that rationality for
the purposes of s 76 is pure rationality as fully differentiated from
reasonableness — merely to opine that in light of the Visser Sitrus
decision as well as a cold, objective reading of the relevant provision, the
law seems to indicate a construction where the two concepts do not,
contextually, have identical content; as well as a construction where
rationality is a lower standard than the subjective standard of reason-
ableness for care and skill.
Commercial activity entails risk, and decision-making in business
often involves the conscious and active taking of risks.74 Indeed it is one
of the fundamental jurisprudential policy pillars of the rule itself.75
Nonetheless, under the current companies’ regime, directors making
such decisions are required to display a set standard of care and skill in
the making of those decisions. Yet they are deemed to have acted with the
necessary care and skill if their (informed) actions have a rational
connection with the beliefs or value judgments that underlie them. This
leads to the crucial question: is there any practical difference between
negligent conduct that is so unreasonable that it cannot even be
characterised as rational, and gross negligence?
Consider the meaning of gross negligence, which sits at the far end of
the spectrum of conduct. As confirmed by Philotex (Pty) Ltd and others v
Snyman and others; Braitex (Pty) Ltd and others v Snyman and others,76 in
Portnet v The Owners of the MV ‘Stella Tingas’77 Scott JA defines the
concept as follows:78
‘... [T]o qualify as gross negligence the conduct in question, although
falling short of dolus eventualis, must involve a departure from the
standard of the reasonable person to such an extent that it may properly be
73 The rule is ‘radically different’, comparatively speaking — Jones, (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ
326 at 327.
74 See, for example, Bekink, (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 95 at 98 and 113–114, Bouwman, (2009)
21 SA Merc LJ 509 at 523–524.
75 Alongside the non-deterrence of competent persons in becoming directors, avoiding
judicial supplanting of directors’ decisions, preventing shareholders from usurping directors
in matters of management, and keeping existing ‘market mechanisms’ fulfilling the same
function unhindered — Bouwman, (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 509 at 523–524 and Kennedy-Good
& Coetzee, (2006) Obiter 62 at 65–66.
76 1998 (2) SA 138 (SCA), in the more commercial context of reckless trading — cf. for
example, Cassim (ed) et al, (Juta 2012) 591 and generally for the above Bekink, (2008) 20 SA
Merc LJ 95 at 101.
77 Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet v The Owners of the MV ‘Stella Tingas’ & another [2003] 1 All SA
286 (SCA).
78 Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet paras 290–291.
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categorized as extreme; it must demonstrate, where there is found to be
conscious risk-taking, a complete obtuseness of mind or, where there is no
conscious risk-taking, a total failure to take care. If something less were
required, the distinction between ordinary and gross negligence would
lose its validity.’
Thus, consider the position of a company-plaintiff. In order to get past
the business judgment rule, the rational relationship between the belief
and the resultant decision has to be assailed. In other words, without
relying on the merits of the decision, it has to be shown that a director’s
decision to take a specific risk (ostensibly in the company’s interests) was
wholly without a rational basis. As such, the director’s belief (or
‘business judgment’ as it were) underlying a decision must be shown to
be entirely baseless.
This is by no means impossible, but it would imply that the
risk-taking on the facts demonstrates attributes very close to a ‘complete
obtuseness of mind’,79 and was therefore extremely unreasonable.
Reasonableness and rationality are both standards of human conduct,
and as such must be legal constructs on the same conceptual continuum,
or spectrum.80 Thus, proving irrationality would for all practical intents
and purposes (specifically in terms of evidence and argument in
litigation) be tantamount to proving a unreasonableness that very, very
closely resembles gross negligence.
(c) Impact
The conclusion of this analysis is that for practical purposes — on a
spectrum of conduct between excessive reasonableness and the most
extreme gross negligence — the business judgment rule’s ‘rationality’
encroaches far enough onto the territory traditionally inhabited by (the
duty of care and skill’s unique form of) reasonableness, for it to have
reduced the scope of liability to something that closely resembles a
related but much less stringent legal construct — gross negligence.81 The
net effect is that the ambit of the duty of care and skill has been reduced
to something close to its earliest English law form.82
An important question is thus: is there some hidden or implicit policy
basis that explains why directors should be excused from the ordinary
79 Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet paras 290–291.
80 They are indeed recognised as such in, for instance, the field of administrative law for the
purposes of judicial review.
81 See Cassidy, (2009) 20 Stell LR 373 at 399–400 for commentary to the same effect, and
support for the overall analysis found above.
82 See above at 4 and n16.
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principles of the law of delict when, for example, they are not profession-
als such as auditors or attorneys? Far more importantly, however, is the
following: if the standard for liability is then in fact for all intents and
purposes akin to gross negligence, does the test for the duty of care and
skill then actually differ from the test for s 22(1)’s acquiescence to
recklessness, which requires at a minimum gross negligence? Or, if one
can not go as far as that, does this state of affairs not to some degree (ie in
cases of insolvency) render the care and skill remedy defunct, as it
becomes more difficult to pursue than an action based on the reckless
carrying on of business?
III RECKLESS TRADING
In this section, directors’ liability for ‘reckless trading’83 in the current
Companies Act, as well as the applicable provisions of its predecessor,
will be examined.
It considers whether, in some respects, the reckless trading provision
provides potential company-litigants a better remedial avenue for
holding a director or directors liable once a company is insolvent than
does the action for breach of duties of care and skill as outlined above.
(a) The provision’s meaning
This section aims, as stated, to examine the proper construction of the
statutory action for reckless trading. In so doing, it will briefly analyse
the provision’s history, the treatment given to it by the courts, and its
indirect reliance on certain delictual constructs. Thereafter, in the
following section, the two remedies will be compared.
The Companies Act 46 of 1926 did not contain a reckless trading
provision. In 1939, s 185bis was inserted into the Act. This provision was
the forerunner of the reckless trading concept found in modern
company law, but was severely limited in scope: it did not go as far as to
include recklessness, and applied only to trading once a company was in
judicial management or the process of winding up.84 ‘Reckless’ trading
itself was only introduced in s 424 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, as
above, applying to ‘winding-up, judicial management or otherwise’,85
indicating that the remedy was from then on also available whilst the
83 It is important to note that here the focus is on reckless trading, rather than fraudulent
trading.
84 Philotex (Pty) Ltd para 142G.
85 Not to be given a euisdem generis interpretation [own emphasis].
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company remained a going concern.86 This seems to have been in order
to ‘extend the remedy by means of which a restraining influence can be
exercised on ‘‘over-sanguine directors.’’ ’87 The most authoritative case
in South Africa in this regard remains Philotex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman.88
Liability for reckless trading is neither contractual nor delictual but
statutory in nature. It must be proved that a director ‘acquiesced in the
carrying on of the company’s business despite knowing that it is
conducted in a manner prohibited by section 22(1)’,89 ie at least in a
reckless manner. Under the current Act, ‘knowing’, ‘knowingly’ and
‘knows’90
‘when used with respect to a person, and in relation to a particular
matter, means that the person either-
(a) had actual knowledge of the matter; or
(b) was in a position in which the person reasonably ought to
have —
(i) had actual knowledge;
(ii) investigated the matter to an extent that would have
provided the person with actual knowledge; or
(iii) taken other measures which, if taken, would reasonably be
expected to have provided the person with actual knowl-
edge of the matter’.
Further, ‘acquiesce’ means ‘[t]o agree, esp. tacitly; to accept something,
typically with some reluctance; to agree to do what someone else wants;
to comply with, concede’.91
The wording of s 424, on the other hand, read that a director may not
be ‘party to’ reckless trading. In the Philotex case, the court held that
‘being party to’ does not involve ‘the taking of positive steps in the
carrying on of the business; it may be enough to support or concur in the
86 Cassim (ed) et al, (Juta 2012) 588.
87 Philotex (Pty) Ltd para 142H.
88 Philotex (Pty) Ltd para 142H. For a detailed discussion of the judgment, broadly in
keeping with the observations made below, see Havenga, ‘Director’s personal liability for
reckless trading: Philotex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman, Braitex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman 1998 2 SA 138
(SCA)’ (1998) 61 Tydskrif vir Hedendaasge Romeins-Hollandse Reg 719.
89 Section 77(3)(b) of the Act.
90 Section 1.
91 Oxford English Dictionary 3 ed (2011).
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conduct of the business ...’.92 Thus it is submitted that this aspect of the
test is probably in principle no different to section 424 of the 1973 Act.93
It is unsurprising that most, if not all, cases dealing with reckless
trading do so in the context of insolvency. It would seem, also, that to
trade recklessly in this context is to trade whilst being commercially
insolvent. This makes a great deal of sense, as it would be at odds with
commercial practice for companies, who for example often trade on
credit, to be unable to trade when technically insolvent by virtue of the
rule.94
However, if the requirements for proving reckless trading are satis-
fied, a director is, as per s 77(3)(b), liable for any ‘... loss, damage, or
costs sustained by the company as a direct or indirect result of ...’ the
director’s knowing acquiescence to the transaction, or series of transac-
tions. In essence, the inquiry hinges again on the standard of conduct set
by the Act.
(b) Select aspects of importance: negligence and causation
(i) Recklessness and negligence
The starting point for an understanding of the development of the
‘negligence’ portion of the test for reckless trading is Howard v Herrigel
and another.95 Therein one finds the following:96
‘... [T]he applicant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that
the person sought to be held liable had knowledge of the facts from
which the conclusion is properly to be drawn that the business of
the company was or is being carried on recklessly ... It would not be
necessary to go further and prove that the person also had actual
knowledge of the legal consequences of those facts.’
It constitutes a purely objective test for recklessness, capable of being
influenced only by external factors,97 and was further confirmed in both
92 Philotex (Pty) Ltd para 143, and see also Howard v Herrigel 1991 (2) SA 660 (A) para
674H; and Havenga, (1998) 61 THRHR 719 at 720.
93 See also Van der Linde, ‘Personal liability of directors for corporate fault — An
exploration’ (2008) 20(4) SA Merc LJ 439 at 443.
94 Cf for example, Cassim (ed) et al, (Juta 2012) 590 or ‘The New Companies Act:
Peculiarities and anomalies’ (2009) 126(4) South African Law Journal 806 at 812.
95 Howard para 674H.
96 Howard para 673I–674H.
97 Howard para 678C–E, stating that:
‘... the legal rules are the same for all directors. In the application of those rules to
the facts one must obviously take into account, for example, the factors referred to
in the judgment of Margo J in the Fisheries Development case and any others which
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Ozinsky v Lloyd and others,98 and Ex Parte Lebowa.99 Throughout this
line of cases, it was held that a company that continues to incur debts
when the reasonable businessman would be of the opinion that there
would be no reasonable prospect of paying the creditors when the debts
are due, is considered to be trading recklessly.100
However, the Philotex case — the locus classicus regarding ‘reckless
trading’ in South Africa — deviates from this approach in setting out the
definitive test for recklessness, and brings the inquiry closer to the
subjective-objective dichotomy exhibited by the standard prescribed by
the duty of care and skill. First, it states that the test remains partially
objective, because a person’s conduct is measured against the standard
of conduct of the reasonable person. The subjective belief of a director as
to whether payment could be made is neither conclusive, nor relevant if
the reasonable business person in the same circumstances would not
share such a belief.101
Second, however, the court rules that the test is also partially
subjective — one still has to measure the conduct against what is
expected of people moving in the same sphere as (ie comparable to), and
having the same knowledge or access to knowledge as the person in
question.102 In keeping with the Howard case, the inquiry also examines
external factors including, among others, the scope of the business of the
company, the role, functions and powers of the directors, the debts, the
extent of the financial difficulties of the company and the prospects of
recovery.103
The court’s most important contribution, however, is its treatment of
the recklessness-concept itself. First, the court confirms that it involves
at least an element of risk, regardless of whether the defendant is
subjectively aware thereof.104 Second, as to the relationship between
‘recklessness’ and ‘negligence’, it makes a number of crucial observa-
tions.
may be relevant in judging the conduct of the director. His access to the particular
information and the justification for relying upon the reports he receives from
others, for example, might be relevant factors to take into account, whether or not
the person is to be classified as an ‘‘executive’’ or ‘‘non-executive’’ director.’
98 1992 (3) SA 396 (C).
99 Development Corp Ltd 1989 (3) SA 71 (T).
100 Ozinsky paras 414G–H.
101 Philotex (Pty) Ltd para 147.
102 Philotex (Pty) Ltd para 143; Havenga, (1998) 61 THRHR 719 at 720, and De Koker,
‘Roekelose of bedrieglike dryf van besigheid — ’n verdure hoofstuk’ (1995) 20 Tydskrif vir
Regswetenskap 101 at 114–117.
103 Philotex (Pty) Ltd para 144; see also Bekink, (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 95 at 101.
104 Philotex (Pty) Ltd para 143.
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S v Van Zyl105 held that recklessness included gross negligence. This
was confirmed in S v Dlamini,106 where it was stated that reckless
conduct was a failure to consider the consequences of an action. This
implies an attitude of ‘reckless disregard of such consequences’.107
However, with reference to Ozinsky v Lloyd,108 Philotex clearly distin-
guishes recklessness (including gross negligence) from mere negli-
gence.109
As per the court, in the context of conducting business (specifically,
for instance, the borrowing of money under insolvent or near-insolvent
circumstances) the distinction would be as follows. If the reasonable
businessman, despite believing that a company has a chance of paying its
creditors, would refrain from running a particular risk because of
circumstances which create a material but not high risk of non-payment,
a director who does run that risk and incurs credit is acting unreasonably
and therefore negligently. Nonetheless, such conduct would not be
characterised as recklessness, and thus is not grossly negligent. Gross
negligence, on the other hand, would be where the reasonable business
person would know that non-payment was a ‘virtual certainty’.110
The latter, however, is an extreme form of recklessness, and there is
some middle ground. If, objectively speaking, there was a ‘strong chance’
of non-payment, the test for liability would also be satisfied, and ‘[i]t is
not possible to attempt to draw the line between negligence and
recklessness more exactly. Each case must turn on its own facts and
involve a value judgment on those facts’.111 What is clear from Philotex is
that gross negligence is at least the de facto standard of conduct for
determining recklessness.
Therefore, at present, the quasi-delictual negligence inquiry within
the reckless trading provision remains one that takes into account the
subjective characteristics of directors. Nonetheless, what directors lose
on the swings, they gain on the roundabouts, as liability is, essentially,
confined to gross negligence or something very similar.
(ii) Causation
It is trite that causation will have to be proved for liability for the breach
of the duty of care and skill. Is this also required for reckless trading?
105 1969 (1) SA 553 (A) paras 559 D–G.
106 1988 (2) SA 302 (A) paras 308D–E.
107 S v Dlamini paras 308D–E.
108 See n98.
109 Philotex (Pty) Ltd para 143.
110 Philotex (Pty) Ltd paras 146–147.
111 Philotex (Pty) Ltd para 147.
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In Philotex the court held that ‘a director can be held personally liable
for liabilities of the company without proof of any causal link between
his conduct and those liabilities’.112 However, in L & P Plant Hire BK v
Bosch,113 the court seemingly held that there had to be a causal link
between the reckless conduct and the close corporation’s inability to
pay.114
From Saincic and others v Industro-Clean (Pty) Ltd and another,115 it
would appear that the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the L & P
Plant Hire dicta in the context of causation required in terms of section
424. In this respect, the court stated116
‘... that as far as creditors are concerned there must be some or other causal
link between the fraudulent conduct and the inability to pay the debt. In
other words, it must be due to the fraudulent conduct that a particular
creditor’s debt cannot be repaid.’
However, the Supreme Court of Appeal clarified the meaning of this
dictum in Fourie v FirstRand Bank Ltd,117 stating:118
‘The context of L & P Plant Hire was that there was no evidence that the
close corporation concerned was unable to pay its debts. Read in that
context, the judgment is rightly understood ... as saying no more than this:
if, despite the reckless conduct of the company’s business, it is nevertheless
able to pay its debt to a particular creditor, that creditor has no cause of
action under s 64 — or s 424 — against those responsible for the reckless
conduct.’
Thus, it held that:119
‘L & P Plant Hire was never intended to deviate from those decisions of this
court (such as [Howard and Philotex]) which expressly laid down the
general principle that s 424 does not require proof of a causal link between
the relevant conduct and the company’s inability to pay the debt. ... Saincic
recognised an exception to this general principle where the converse had
been positively established, namely that there was plainly no causal
connection between the relevant conduct and the debt . . .’.
This renders the matter essentially above the level of dispute —
causation, in short, is a factor to be considered, but no cause of action
112 Philotex (Pty) Ltd para 142.
113 2002 (2) SA 662 (SCA).
114 L & P Plant Hire BK paras 39 and 40.
115 2009 (1) SA 538 (SCA).
116 Saincic para 29.
117 2013 (1) SA 204 (SCA).
118 Fourie para 28.
119 Fourie paras 30–31.
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will stand or fall on its presence or absence from a particular set of facts
unless the company is seemingly able to pay its debts, or there is no
relationship whatsoever between the reckless conduct and the compa-
ny’s (therefore unrelated) inability to pay.
The new Act, with its inclusion of ‘as a direct or indirect result’ in
s 77(3), maintains the same broad approach, concretising the matter
only as far as to say the loss must be in some way connected to the
recklessness. An ‘indirect result’ is most certainly couched widely
enough to include cases where causation is less than definitive. One
cannot find fault with the reasoning in the above judgments, and it
would certainly be overly restrictive to interpret the new provision as
narrowing the scope of the remedy via stricter causal requirements. In
sum, therefore, it would be accurate to say that whilst some ‘cognisable
link’ between the conduct and commercial insolvency is necessary, it
does not require in all cases a stricter ‘causal link’.
IV CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
In this section, a number of critical perspectives, based on the preceding
analysis are presented. This is centred on the practical effects of the
remedial dispensation effected by the Companies Act, and whether these
effects are in line with the policy principles that lie behind those
provisions. This is done with respect to (1) companies approaching the
point of liquidation — ie insolvent but still trading; and (2) companies
beyond the point of liquidation, where the 1973 Companies Act remains
applicable.
(a) Insolvent, but not in liquidation: remedial consequences
(i) The perspective of the company
As seen above, the courts have held in the context of the reckless trading
provisions that recklessness includes gross negligence as a minimum
standard, and that there is nothing to distinguish ‘recklessness’ per se
from ‘gross negligence’ except that the former can exceed the latter.
Furthermore, it has been argued in § II(b)(ii) and § II(c) that under the
regime of the current Companies Act, the standard of conduct in cases of
breach of the duty of care and skill has been so attenuated by the business
judgment rule that effectively what is required to be proved to hold
directors liable for a breach of the duty of care and skill is the practical
equivalent of gross negligence.
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This is a significant aspect of the new Companies regime. To grasp the
full effect, regard must be had for the effect of s 77. Both s 77(2)(a)120
and (3)(b)121 make it clear that a director may be held liable ‘...for any
loss, damages, or costs sustained by the company ...’. Historically, the
company has always had, and continues to have, a remedy for breach of
the duty of care and skill available to it. However, this has not always
been the case regarding the remedy for reckless or fraudulent trading.
The approach is, in fact, a radical departure from the predecessors of
s 22(1) in the Companies Acts of both 1926 (s 185bis) and 1973 (s 424),
of which the company itself was unable, whilst a going concern, to avail
itself.122 For the first time in South African company law, the company
itself is provided with recourse against its directors for their part in the
company having been allowed to carry on its business in this prohibited
manner. Therefore, should a company which is insolvent but not in
liquidation want to hold one or more of its errant directors liable for
putting it in this position, it would effectively have a choice between
litigating on the basis of reckless trading or a breach of the duty of care
and skill.
In § II(c), the question of whether these two remedies practically differ
was posed. It is trite that they do not share an Aquilian character, and
that only in actions for breach of care and skill must all five delictual
elements be satisfied. Specifically, the remedy based on s 22(1) requires
neither the burden of attributing some dimension of objective unrea-
sonableness to the state of affairs in question (‘wrongfulness’), nor
necessarily a full exploration of the causal effects of the defendant’s
conduct for it to be successfully utilised.123 This raises the question of
why a plaintiff-company would choose to enforce the duty of care and
skill. From the perspective of litigation, a company would be burdened
with a more difficult and complex case, requiring more to be proven
than in pursuing liability on the basis of reckless trading. The submis-
sion made here is that it is far more likely in future that companies in
such circumstances will make use of the latter, rather than the former, to
recoup its losses from directors.
120 Governing liability for, inter alia, a breach of the duty of care and skill.
121 Governing liability for, inter alia, contravention of s 22(1), the reckless or fraudulent
trading provision.
122 The 1926 provision provides this remedy to ‘... the Master, or the liquidator or any
creditor or contributory to the company ...’, and the 1973 provision adds to these person also
‘... the judicial manager ... [and] ... any member ... of the company ...’. It is in neither statute
extended to the company itself in a manner comparable to the remedies for breach of the
fiduciary duties or duty of care and skill.
123 Kennedy-Good & Coetzee, (2006) Obiter 277 at 281.
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(ii) Creditor protection: a counter-intuitively positive policy shift
In light of the above, the crucial issue in terms of the Act is its impact on
creditor protection.
From the perspective of a creditor, as a company steadily approaches
the point of liquidation, it will be of utmost importance to institute
proceedings as soon as possible. This is in order for him to obtain and
execute judgment before formal winding-up and pre-emptively circum-
vent the concursus creditorum. However, the Act seemingly bars a
creditor from utilising s 22(1) to protect its interests. That is not the
manner in which the Act has been interpreted to date, but it is argued
that the currently prevalent interpretation is not correct.
According to a number of current authorities,124 the only manner in
which a creditor would be able to institute action for the recovery of
losses as a result of reckless or fraudulent trading is through the
operation of s 218(2), which states that
‘[a]ny person who contravenes any provision of this Act is liable to
any other person for any loss or damage suffered by that person as a
result of that contravention’.
It is certainly uncontentious to assert that the historic policy-basis of this
remedy has been creditor-protection. Section 185bis(1) of the 1926 Act
and s 424(1) of the 1973 Act explicitly state that ‘[i]f ... it appears that any
business of the company has been carried on . . .’ (in terms of the latter
Act only is added ‘... recklessly or ...’) ‘... with intent to defraud the
creditors of the company or creditors of any other person or for any other
fraudulent purpose ...’,125 the remedy is activated. Section 185bis holds
‘any of the directors, whether past or present’ liable, whilst s 424(1)
holds ‘any person’ liable.
The remedy clearly functioned as counter-balance to the corporate
form, through which individual creditors were able to recoup their
losses in instances where, due to the operation of both juristic personal-
ity and limited liability, they otherwise could not.
In contrast, s 22(1) chooses to do away with specific reference to
creditors, substituting the italicised phrasing above with ‘any person’.
Furthermore, s 22(1) is not the full operative extent of the Act’s
arrangements regarding reckless or fraudulent trading. It has been
fragmented, and partially placed also in s 77(3)(b). Nonetheless, in
124 Such as Wainer, (2009) SALJ 806 at 812; Cassim (ed) et al, (Juta 2012) 587, 589; Delport
& Vorster (eds), Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (LexisNexis, Service Issue 10,
2015) s 22; and Rabinowitz v Van Graan 2013 (5) SA 315 (GSJ) para 18.
125 [Own emphasis].
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Rabinowitz v Van Graan and others,126 the court made two very
important observations in this context.
First, the court held that it is in principle correct that if a director is
found to have acted in conflict with s 214(1)(c),127 such a director has
‘contravened the Act’, thereby activating the provisions of s 218(2).128
This may or may not be correct. It is difficult to see how the latter
provision, which exists to supplement the civil liability dimension of the
Act, can be brought into operation by a provision existing specifically to
govern the criminal liability paradigm of the Act. The basic argument
advanced here is that a ‘contravention’ of the Act for the purposes of
s 218 must be read to mean a contravention of the Act’s civil provisions
only. It is, however, in line with a literal interpretation of the Act, and as
the primary focus of this article is on reckless, rather than fraudulent,
trading, the point is not pursued.
Second, after citing various contemporary authorities that reach the
same conclusion,129 the court holds that in view of the delinquency
provisions in s 162(5)(c), the criminal liability provisions in s 214, and
the express liability in favour of the company found in s 77(3)(b), it
cannot be the case that the legislature intended to exclude individual
creditors from seeking remedial action for a contravention of s 22(1).130
As pointed out, this is in line both with the legislative history of s185bis
and s 424 of the previous Companies Acts respectively. Prima facie, it
does indeed seem unreasonable that an individual creditor is unable to
hold directors personally liable for their role in a company’s reckless
trading.
Nonetheless, it is submitted that the Act has indeed barred creditors
from instituting action on the basis of s 22(1), for a number of reasons.
These reasons fall into two main categories: interpretive issues, and
arguments based on the plaintiff of preference131 principle, operating in
conjunction with the salient policy principles underlying the protection
of creditors.
126 See n124.
127 Section 214(1)(c) reads: ‘A person is guilty of an offence if the person...was knowingly a
party to any act or omission by a company calculated to defraud a creditor or employee of the
company, or a holder of the company’s securities, or with another fraudulent purpose ...’. The
action in casu was instituted for fraudulent trading, which is the ‘offence’ in question. It is
crucial to note that this section, unlike s 218, includes the elements of knowledge and
participation.
128 Rabinowitz paras 13–17.
129 Rabinowitz paras 18.1, 18.2.
130 Rabinowitz paras 20, 21, 22.
131 A formulation preferred here over the more often used terminology of ‘proper plaintiff’
or ‘proper claimant’ as derived from Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189.
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A. The interpretive difficulties of s 218 in the context of s 22(1):
The wording of s 218 makes it clear that a provision of the Companies
Act must be contravened for it to provide an injured party with a remedy.
The first question that therefore arises is whether all the Act’s provisions
can be ‘contravened’. Clearly not — for example definitional,132 inter-
pretive133 or any other type of provision that is not peremptory or
substantially directory are hermeneutically incapable of being contra-
vened. In contrast, any provision which is by nature prescriptive or in
some way regulates conduct is capable of contravention.
Thus, it is clear that s 22(1) can be contravened — but only by the
company itself, as the section prescribes what the company itself may and
may not do.134 Section 218(2) recourse against the juristic person (which
indeed seems hermeneutically possible) is, of course, practically moot as
judgment creditors do not obtain a preferential position in the concur-
sus. More importantly, if put differently: any one or more of the
directing minds with the power to act ‘as the company’ cannot, when
acting as the company,135 personally contravene s 22(1). Whilst a
director is unable to contravene s 22(1), the conduct of directors in
relation to s 22(1) is governed by s 77(3)(b) as above. The salient
question, then, is whether a director may contravene the latter section by
knowingly acquiescing to the company’s contravention of the former.
Yet, in contrast to s 76, the section does not operate prescriptively —
its wording merely empowers the company to hold directors liable for
conduct delineated therein. Therefore, a creditor can neither argue that
a director contravened s 22(1), nor s 77(3)(b), and certainly not that a
person ‘contravenes any provision of this Act’ merely by acting in a
manner that exposes that same person to liability towards the company
in terms of the Act. It is fundamental to remember that in this context,
when one speaks of holding ‘a director liable’ it means holding a director
personally liable.136
That, however, is not the end of the inquiry. Whilst s 77(3)(b) can
itself not hermeneutically be contravened, it is probably correct to state
that the section tacitly imposes on directors an implicit duty not to
knowingly acquiesce to the company carrying on its business in a
132 Such as s 1 or s 43(1).
133 Such as s 7.
134 It is important to note that whilst a creditor may surely use s 218 to found a claim against
the company for a ‘pure’ breach of s 22(1), that would not confer any advantages in terms of
the overall concursus creditorum.
135 Such that, constructively, the company itself is acting.
136 Thus, even if a single director has the power to act as the company and does so recklessly
or fraudulently, the director him- or herself is not contravening s 22(1); the company is.
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‘reckless’ manner. One could argue, therefore, that a creditor could
utilise section 218(2) by averring that the contravention in question was
acting in conflict with this implied duty imposed by the Act.
Unfortunately this argument also cannot aid a creditor-plaintiff with
a cause of action, as it omits the question of to whom that implicit duty is
owed. Section 22(1) imposes a duty on the company, towards ‘any
person’, but only empowers the company itself to assert its co-relative
right against its own directing minds — via s 77(3)(b).137 Why?
Section 22(1) provides a standard of conduct for the company, and
s 77(3)(b) identifies those persons who have played an actionable part in
(1) the company acting in conflict with that standard, (2) to its own
detriment. Thus in order to allow the company to proceed in effect
against its own directing minds, s 77(3)(b) imposes a subsidiary duty
towards the company upon those minds — its directors — in order to
give effect to that standard.
The premise of this ‘loop of liability’ is the violation of a standard of
conduct imposed on the company (to the benefit of third parties), but it
is the consequent harm done by the company to itself that actuates it (as
is the case with the entire s 77). The insight from this analysis is that the
subsidiary duty of the directors — not to acquiesce — is owed not
towards ‘any person’, but rather toward the company itself only.
Therefore a creditor cannot argue that s 218(2) has been activated on
this basis — the duty not to acquiesce knowingly is not owed toward
creditors, and breach of this duty can found no cause of action in favour
a creditor-plaintiff.
B. The company as the plaintiff of preference: a policy analysis
In addition to the interpretive argument, it is submitted that there are
legal policy reasons why this seemingly ‘radical’ interpretation should
stand. In essence, the argument advanced is that it is in the best interests
of creditors that the company itself remain the plaintiff of preference in
actions concerning s 22(1).
It is a well-established principle of company law that shareholders
enjoy primacy among the group of stakeholders in companies, and
therefore enjoy the benefits not only of certain governance rights, but
also of various protective legal mechanisms to safeguard against agency-
risks inherent in the separation of ownership and control. This enjoy-
ment is definitively to the exclusion of the company’s creditors whilst a
137 A quirk of juristic personality which, as is argued below, is underpinned by a very sound
policy basis.
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going concern. However, it is another fundamental principle of com-
pany law that the interests of creditors enjoy primacy over shareholders
regarding companies’ debts, such that in principle, shareholder-
creditors usually stand last in the queue of creditors, and more impor-
tantly, that shareholders are entitled to the residual assets of the
company only after all liabilities have been dealt with.
It is further uncontentious that the mischief informing s 22(1) is:
actions by the company, taken in a objectionable manner, to the
detriment of its stakeholders — in light of the provision’s history,
especially its creditors. It has also been argued that as a company
approaches ‘the zone of insolvency’, there is also a definitive shift in
emphasis regarding the duties of directors, and the interests of the
company’s creditors gain ever-increasing significance.138 Therefore, the
central question becomes how, rather than whether, to protect the
company’s creditors against these kinds of abuses.139
Beginning with Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd,140 through the
construct of juristic personality, limited liability firmly entrenched the
internal inviolability of the company as a sovereign economic unit. As a
matter of enduring principle, creditors (and other stakeholders) were
thereby placed on the far side of the so-called corporate veil.141 Yet the
remedy for reckless trading allows individual creditors to disregard the
corporate veil and hold directors personally liable. Are there compelling
theoretical positions to justify a departure from this principle when
reckless trading has been allowed to occur?
Legal-economic perspectives of the company (or the ‘firm’), which
are highly influential in determining the policy basis for company
legislation, provide a number of normative insights into how such a
remedy ought to operate. The influential ‘nexus of contracts’ theory of
Jensen and Meckling posits the reduction of economic transaction and
monitoring costs as the central function of the standardised corporate
form.142 By functioning as a counter-measure to juristic personality, the
138 Rajak in ‘Director and officer liability in the zone of insolvency: A comparative analysis’
(2008) 1 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 1 at
25–30.
139 See also Sigwadi, ‘Personal liability for the debts of close corporations: case comments’
(2003) SA Merc LJ 303 as in the context of s 424 of the 1973 Companies Act; and Rajak, (2008)
PER 1 at 23–25; and in terms of all stakeholders, see Esser & Du Plessis, ‘The stakeholder
debate and directors’ fiduciary duties’ (2007) 19 (3) SA Merc LJ 346 at 350–351.
140 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 para 52.
141 In this regard, see also the comments of Rajak, (2008) 1 PER 1 at 1–10, where ‘the
financial burden of corporate failure would be thrown on to the creditors’ (at 8).
142 See most importantly Jensen & Meckling, ‘The theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs, and ownership structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics at 305.
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reckless trading remedy undermines this, and must (like all instances
where the corporate veil is ignored) therefore be shown to advance the
cause of economic efficiency further by disregarding the internal
inviolability of the corporate form, than by upholding it. It does not.
It is submitted that one of the most important reasons such a nexus of
contracts (in the economic sense) is coalesced into a juristic person143 is
the parity of creditors (and additional mechanisms for their protection)
it achieves in order to compensate for the trade-off of limited liability.
This is supported by subsequent theoretical developments that argue
that the corporate form functions as more than a specialised and
standardised legal nexus of contracts that reduces transaction and other
economic costs.
Specifically, as argued by Hansmann and Kraakman, it serves a
crucially important, creditor-centric, economic function — the ‘parti-
tioning of assets’. Where managers’ and owners’ assets are partitioned
off from those of the company, it allows creditors to conclude far more
economically efficient contracts. Assets are not only separate but also
partitioned through limited liability — thus creditors are placed in a
much better informational position from which to make judgment-calls
regarding the terms on which to extend credit. This greatly improves the
economic efficiency and risk dynamics of lending — both to the
aforementioned individuals, and their companies respectively and
separately.144
But more importantly the same reasoning also applies between
creditors of the company amongst themselves. How are potential credi-
tors accurately to determine the most efficient terms of credit if it is
uncertain whether other creditors will (on the cusp of liquidation)
undermine the integrity of this partition by piercing the corporation
veil? It hampers the ability to make sound economic judgments. As such,
juristic personality (as a legal construct) is shown to be more than a
descriptive heuristic for the legal means whereby economic cost-
reduction is achieved.
In this light, one of the central tenets of juristic personality gains
renewed significance — the ability to sue in own name. In essence the
argument advanced here is that, by allowing a company to sue in own
name, it allows that company to absorb any losses it may have suffered
from errant conduct (whether committed internally or by third parties)
143 In other words, the ‘firm’ as a co-ordinating third entity representing a contractual locus
through which business is organised — Hansmann & Kraakman, ‘Organizational law as asset
partitioning’ (2000) 44 European Economic Review 807 at 808–809.
144 Hansmann & Kraakman, (2002) EER 807 at 810–812.
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and return the quantum of loss to the partitioned group of assets. This
restores the parity of creditors that partitioning brings about, facilitating
the efficient allocation of credit, as well as the fair distribution of harm.
This policy perspective redoubles the fundamental importance of the
plaintiff of preference principle, as derived from Foss v Harbottle145 — it
protects the company’s ability to recoup its own losses first, to the
exclusion of third parties (including its owners).
This is the cause of the development of the ‘derivative action’. Foss v
Harbottle also provides the doctrinal perspective underlying the deriva-
tive action (now contained exclusively in s 165 of the Act) — namely,
when a company is harmed, the company itself must be allowed to
litigate first to recover those losses, unless the contrary can be proven, in
which case litigation can be undertaken on the company’s behalf.
This perspective is further supported by the approach in Fundstrust v
Van Deventer,146 which further emphasises the sanctity of corporate
personality, and by implication the primacy of the company’s right to
sue, and be sued, (first) in own name. The court specifically stated that
any liability imposed on directors (and therefore which ‘[impinges] on
the corporate existence’) should be interpreted strictly. Importantly, this
statement was made within the context of personal liability of directors
in personal liability companies, which makes the point even more
compelling in the context of ordinary companies, where such ‘corporate
existence’ is more strongly enforced.
The outlined theoretical perspectives on the firm reveal an over-
arching policy-basis that informs the doctrinal position evidenced by
these two cases, and further justifies the integrity and inviolability of the
legal and economic unit (the company). The law protects the ability of
the company to preserve its economic integrity to the exclusion of
others, because the internal arrangements inherent to that ‘partitioned’
economic unit of assets (ie arrangements within the nexus of contracts)
will adequately discount the corresponding benefits amongst its stake-
holders. The underlying assumption is inviolable:147 that corporate form
(juristic personality with limited liability) is a correctly calibrated institu-
tion, which accurately accounts for the constellation of interests and
interest-clusters it brings about. Creditors’ harm (which is indirect,
flowing from the harm of the company — for example through reckless
trading) must only be actionable if one can say with certainty that the
145 See n131.
146 Fundstrust (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Van Deventer 1997 (1) SA 710 (A).
147 Seeing as to do away with it requires a complete re-evaluation of the policy basis for
separate juristic personality in the first place.
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company is not in the best position to discount that harm amongst its
various stakeholders, specifically its body of creditors.148
This brings one to the operation of s 424 of the 1973 Companies Act.
This section, unlike its predecessor, applied not only to companies in
judicial management or winding up, but also whilst the company
remained a going concern. The section explicitly made creditors, among
others, a plaintiff of preference, and excluded the company from
bringing this action against its directors.
The context of this section’s analysis is companies that are insolvent
but not yet in liquidation. Thus consider the effects of s 424: as the
company approaches or surpasses the point of insolvency (and is in all
likelihood approaching formal liquidation) it effectively allows one or
more of the overall body of creditors to obtain judgment against errant
parties (first and foremost the directors) within the company, holding
them personally liable, before the liquidation process is initiated.
The implication is that, if successful, it will in most cases reduce these
judgment-debtors to men of straw. The eventual liquidators will be
unable to recover any meaningful amount from them through liability
they may owe the company due to their recklessness (such liability is also
likely). Thus it reduces the company’s ability to recoup related losses
from these individuals through remedial avenues such as breach of
fiduciary duties, or the duty of care and skill.
As a consequence, first, the amount the overall body of creditors will
eventually receive is reduced, to the detriment of the concursus as a
whole. Second, it allows the litigating creditor to drink twice from the
well — first from those ‘party to’ the recklessness personally, and second
from the company after winding up. Third, it favours the biggest and
strongest creditors, for whom it will be comparatively easier to under-
take such (expensive and burdensome) litigation. In contrast, the
weaker creditors (arguably those in greatest need for protection) suffer
as a result.
By supplanting the company with its individual creditors as the
preferential plaintiff, s 424’s policy stance confused the protection of
individual creditors with the broader principle of creditor protection. In
reality, it created the potential for harm to the body of creditors as a
whole, to the benefit of the few who are able to ‘skip the queue’ via the
operation of s 424.
148 It is important to note, however, that there is a difference between asserting that the
corporate form is a ‘correctly’ calibrated institution and asserting it is a perfectly calibrated
institution — if the latter was the case, there would be no need for supplementary creditors’
remedies whatsoever.
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In contrast to its predecessors, s 22(1) of the new Act functions to
correct this. In conjunction with s 77(3)(b), it gives the company status
as plaintiff of preference, allowing it to recover the losses it has suffered
from the responsible parties — its directors. In so doing, it allows the
company as judgment-creditor to absorb the quantum of harm in own
name, restore it to the partitioned assets, and use it for the benefit of the
concursus as a whole. Whether as consequence the company is in a
position to pay its debts to its body of creditors and avoid liquidation, or
must still face formal winding up, it will (in line with the principle of
primacy of creditors in matters of company debts) be able to spread the
proceeds amongst all its creditors equally.149 This restores the parity of
treatment on which the economic efficiency of creditors’ evaluations of
future transactions is based, whilst still retaining the deterrent and
punitive functions of the remedy.
Seen as such, three points could be argued. First, the company (even
in liquidation, but more so if insolvent yet still a going concern) is indeed
in the best position to discount the interests of the body of creditors as a
whole, and to effect a fair and equal repayment of its debts. If this is not
accepted, the implicit concession is that the company is not a correctly
calibrated institution for the discounting of benefits and losses to its
stakeholders. Thus it cannot form the point of departure, and the
burden to show otherwise should thus fall on the creditor-plaintiff when
making use of an appropriate remedy.
Second, as a result of this submission, showing why the company is
the plaintiff of preference, it is argued that s 218(2) must be interpreted
restrictively, so that it does not impair the company’s ability to do so (at
the expense of a portion of the concursus). Reading it widely, as leading
authorities seem to do,150 would allow individual creditors to subvert
the proper and fair ranking of the company’s debts by taking action
against the directors directly. Such action would weaken the company’s
ability to collect compensation from internal transgressors and divide it
equally amongst harmed third parties. It must not be forgotten that
149 This approach is also broadly in keeping with s 22(1)’s equivalent in the United
Kingdom’s Insolvency Act of 1986, which empowers the company itself (albeit through the
liquidator) to hold a creditor liable, rather than the creditors themselves. See also Rajak,
(2008) 1 PER 1 at 21–23.
150 See for instance Cassim (ed) et al, (Juta 2012) 589 and 858 (although, with respect,
without any analysis as to why this interpretation is the correct one); or Delport & Vorster
(LexisNexis 2015) 124 at s 22 and s 218 (where the same critique applies). It seems that the
wording of s 218 is, generally, taken at face value, without regard for a policy-basis for how it
ought to be read, nor any inquiry into its hermeneutic interaction with the provisions, which
ostensibly activate its operation (the subject of the next section).
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when a company trades recklessly, it does so at the peril of all creditors
equally.
Therefore, specifically in light of what underlies the principles evi-
denced by Foss and Fundstrust, in order for s 218(2) to have allowed
creditors to so disregard the corporate veil, there must be a compelling
reason. For instance, to rebut the interpretive issues, there should be
something more within the Act (which there is not), or perhaps there
should have been something more to s 218(2) to link it to the s 22(1) and
s 77(3) remedy. Without amendment, the section cannot allow it.
Moreover, the policy-based arguments show that it would in any event
not be a desirous outcome. In fact, the only point favouring the currently
accepted view in favour of creditors’ access to this remedy is the
workings of s 22(1)’s antecedents, and it is submitted that reliance on
past principles, without more, is not enough.
Third is the question of whether such an interpretation leaves
creditors without effective recourse in cases where it would indeed be
justified for them to hold directors personally to task for causing harm to
their interests in the company. Should this be the case, then the demands
of commercial exigency ought to trump both the interpretive and
policy-oriented arguments made above. Yet this is not the case.
In the first instance, there is nothing preventing creditors, jointly or
severally, from bringing a true derivative action in terms of s 165(2)(d)
on behalf of the company against directors who have caused the
company to trade recklessly. Through such an action, litigant-creditors
improve the position of the concursus of which they are members. It
would be difficult, especially as a company approaches the ‘zone of
insolvency’, for a court to deny that such action is either ‘necessary or
expedient’ to protecting the rights of the plaintiffs — by acting on behalf
of the concursus at large, these creditors indirectly protect their own
rights.
Also, action can be brought by creditors for a breach of the duty of
care and skill, via s 218(2). It has been argued above that s 76 of the Act is
indeed capable of contravention, and presents no problem to the
founding of a cause of action in terms of s 218(2). This is perhaps the
most surprising outcome of this analysis. To some extent, the duty of
care and skill and the prohibition on reckless or fraudulent trading have,
from a remedial perspective, actually reversed roles. Whilst it has been
shown that a company will in all likelihood use the less burdensome
requirements of s 77(3)(b) to recover its losses from errant directors, the
company creditors’ path of least resistance has become recourse to the
duty of care and skill via s 218(2).
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In sum, the above attempts to answer a simple question. If a company
trades recklessly, to its own detriment and therefore to the detriment of
its stakeholders, is the point of departure that an individual creditor may
litigate against an errant director before the company has had an
opportunity to do so first? The answer is equally simple — (1) the Act,
literally, does not allow it; (2) a theoretical perspective on companies
indicates it should not be the case; and (3) the doctrinal principles of
juristic personality (as supported by case law) is in harmony with the
theory — only in exceptional circumstances. Therefore, it cannot be the
point of departure.
(b) Insolvent and in liquidation: the on-going operation of
s 424
In spite of the fact that s 22(1) moves the remedial regime of company
law onto a more sound doctrinal footing, s 424 (along with the rest of
Chapter of XIV of the 1973 Companies Act) remains operative for
companies that are insolvent and formally in liquidation; by virtue of
s 79(1)(b) in conjunction with Schedule 5, Item 9.
Despite the fact that a liquidator takes over the management of a
company in liquidation, and also constructively ‘is’ the body of creditors
as the representative of their collective interests, s 424 remains operative.
In effect, therefore, once a company goes into formal winding up,
individual creditors are still able to claim directly from the company’s
directors (or ‘any other person’ responsible).151
V CONCLUSION
This article, through an analysis of the current Companies Act’s
remedies for directors’ breach of the duty of care and skill, and a
company’s reckless trading, respectively, makes two main points. The
first centres on the changing relationship between the two remedies,
concluding that from the company’s perspective there is little use for the
former, as the latter presents a more viable course of action against
errant managers.
In terms of the duty of care and skill, it makes two arguments. First,
concerning negligence, it argues that although the negligence compo-
nent of the care and skill inquiry has been made (if interpreted according
to the heritage of provision’s wording) more objective, and thus less
151 If successful, the liquidators may be unable to recover losses on behalf of the company
from these ‘men of straw’ once a s 424 judgment has been granted and executed.
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forgiving of directors, the import of the business judgment rule has
rendered this irrelevant. All that is currently required of directors who
are reasonably informed is that their business judgments and resultant
decisions bear a rational relationship to the reasons they were made.
This rationality requirement allows directors to act so unreasonably that
the only actionable level of unreasonableness is tantamount to gross
negligence. Second, as a delictual action, the remedy has not only a very
forgiving standard of conduct, but also contains the other four tradi-
tional elements of Aquilian liability, increasing the burden faced by a
litigant-company attempting to utilise this historically toothless remedy.
If it is argued that the common-law position requiring a subjective test to
determine negligence has not been altered in this regard by the statutory
duty, the business judgment rule still has the effect that the company
must prove something very close to gross negligence to hold a director
liable for breaching his duty of care and skill.
In this light, it analyses the remedy against directors for their
acquiescence in the reckless trading of a company, which has under the
new Act become available to the company itself as an alternative to
breach of the duty of care and skill. It shows that — from case law as well
as the interpretation of the Act — the remedy has far less onerous
requirements. Most notable are (1) an essentially equivalent prescribed
standard of conduct, which essentially comes down to gross negligence;
as well as (2) a less complex set of elements activating liability, excluding
both causation and wrongfulness. In conclusion, a company-plaintiff
will most certainly opt for the latter remedy, which is not only less
complex but also less onerous to pursue successfully.
The second broad point, in light of the conclusions of the first, is to
what extent the contravention of the reckless trading provision provides
a direct remedy for creditors against the directors who allowed the
company to conduct its business in a reckless manner. This argument,
focusing on both the structure of the current Act and the theoretical
understanding of the firm that should underpin both it and certain
elements of juristic personality, looks first at companies which are
insolvent yet not in formal liquidation. In this context, it concludes that
the Act may have effectively deprived individual creditors from utilising
the remedy, doing so in favour of the company as the primary plaintiff.
This conclusion is based on a hermeneutic analysis of the provisions of
s 22(1), s 77(3)(b), and s 218(2), which when read together may not
necessarily form the basis of a cause of action for creditors wishing to
hold directors personally liable for their complicity in the company’s
reckless conduct.
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It further argues that this is — counter-intuitively — a step in the
right direction. It is proposed that this serves the overall imperative of
creditor protection much better than the old regime’s provisions do, and
uses a legal-economic policy analysis to justify such a more literal
interpretation of these provisions of the Act.
Briefly, it derives its argument from the legal-economic theories of the
firm and the function of juristic personality, as a standardised nexus of
transaction- and agency-cost reducing contracts; but more importantly
as a means with which to partition the assets of owners and managers
from those of the firm itself to the benefit of creditors. If the legislature
wanted to provide creditors with a direct remedy against directors for a
breach of the reckless trading provisions, it is submitted that an
appropriate amendment be made to s 218(2).
As the section currently reads, it is general in nature and not clear in
terms of what is meant by ‘contravenes any provision of this Act’.
Furthermore, the point of departure of company law is limited liability
and only where the legislature explicitly provides for personal liability
should this point of departure be ignored.
It also argues that a narrower, more unforgiving interpretation of the
Act does not deprive creditors of remedial recourse in exceptional
circumstances. It shows creditors may still rely (1) on the statutory
derivative action; and surprisingly (2) on breach of the duty of care and
skill via s 218(2). Moreover, it shows that is the most efficient, effective
and justifiable manner in which to construe the law. In this sense, the
most surprising outcome of the overall analysis is that the roles of these
‘remedies in flux’ have to a limited degree reversed — the duty of care
and skill serves individual creditors better than the company; the remedy
against directors who allowed the company to trade recklessly serves the
company better than individual creditors, which ultimately serves the
overall body of creditors. Stranger still is the conclusion that this is for
the best — whether an unintended consequence of the drafting of the
2008 Act, or an intentional and laudable realignment of policy objec-
tives.
Lastly, in the context of companies already in winding up, it confirms
that the provisions of the 1973 Act are in force, and that there is little to
aid the concursus of creditors against a cleaning out of directors’ coffers
before they can be brought to task by the liquidator.
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